Tuesday, 10 September 2013

Cracks in Reasons for Court Closure Revealed

I have just heard that the Upper Hutt District Court has been given an earthquake clearance following the recent severe shakes that have hit Wellington. This is interesting as the Minister for Courts Chester Borrows said in a public meeting in November last year that he was closing it because it was an earthquake risk and was going to cost over $700,000 to fix.
The actual quote was never released because of confidentiality concerns. One local builder at a meeting where Borrows made this announcement, said he could undertake the repairs for a fraction of the cost. Now the empty building has been given the all clear. In the meanwhile Upper Hutt has lost jobs and a community has lost their courthouse. While Waipukurau with a population of just 4000 (but in a National electorate) keep theirs.

Wednesday, 3 July 2013

LOCAL BODIES, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, BEGGING BANS AND HOMELESSNESS

LOCAL BODIES, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, BEGGING BANS AND HOMELESSNESS

1.            Recently a number of territorial authorities  including Wellington City Council and the Auckland Super City are considering amending their bylaws to further target begging and by extension those who are homeless. Bylaws address in part the use by citizens of public places within the area controlled by the territorial authority. The citizens of Wellington, like all cities comprise a diverse mix of people and types. Some of our citizens are also homeless.

2.             Like most large cities of the English speaking world, vagrants and their associated social problems, including alcoholism, have been a regular feature during the development of modern society (see e.g. Anderson 1923, Bogue 1963). 

3.             Until recently, their public presence has been fairly unproblematic, with the police tending to use informal measures to deal with them, preferring to ask them to ‘move on’ (Fairhead 1980) rather than invoke formal procedures of arrest, prosecution and so on where they had done nothing other than have a public presence.  Earlier research found that the police tended to adopt a ‘peacekeeping’ rather than law enforcement approach to such people.  As Bittner (1967: 714) put the matter, ‘peace keeping procedure on skid-row consists of three elements.  Patrolmen seek to acquire a rich body of concrete knowledge about people by cultivating personal acquaintance with as many residents as possible.  They tend to proceed against persons mainly on the basis of perceived risk, rather than on the basis of culpability.  And they are more interested in reducing the aggregate total of troubles in the area than in evaluating individual cases according to merit.’ 

4.             The way in most cases to reduce the ‘total of troubles in the area’ was to ask their skid-row customers to periodically move on, pushing any risks they posed out of sight.  Arrest followed by prosecution might simply add to the ‘total of troubles’, solving nothing, wasting valuable police time and resources in a process that became, as it were, a ‘revolving door’ for all concerned: ‘drunks were a drain on resources which could be used more productively. 

5.             They occupied space in police cells, often soiling them, tended to take up more police time than other offenders … and often demanded almost constant attention; and they frequently required medical attention which incurred additional cost’ (Fairhead 1980: 29).

6.             However, in recent years, such people have assumed a much more problematic public presence, along with a range of other street people.  This relates to local councils pursuing entirely admirable policies of ‘reupholstering’ urban domains, particularly city centres (and frequently gentrifying the former skid-row locations), with a view to ensuring that, as in the case of Wellington, ‘the city must be walkable, clean and safe, with people living, working and spending leisure time in the city’ (Statement of Proposal, Liquor Control Bylaw: 2).

7.             In addition in enforcing certain bylaws territorial authorities often work in conjunction with police, such that on a general list day in the District Court, some member(s) of the homeless community will always be appearing, either in relation to a breach of liquor ban or some other minor public order type of charge.

8.             As a lawyer who regularly appears in the District Court on behalf of clients I have begun to question whether the courts of criminal justice are the appropriate forums to address the issues around street people.


General Principles

9.              The Local Government Act 2002 makes it a requirement that all bylaws have to comply with the BORA. In this sense a limit on a fundamental right will only be upheld if it survives section 5 BORA scrutiny. To qualify as a justified limitation, any inroad into a BORA right must be (a) prescribed by law and (b) reasonable and demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.  Once a prima facie BORA infringement has been identified it is up to the local body promoting the infringement to prove that the section 5 requirements are met.

10.          BORA rights are rights not privileges to be granted by officials. A right may be regulated, but only in ways authorised and in accord with section 5 BORA described above. There is the further requirement that any restriction on a BORA right only restrict that right to the least degree possible consistent with the demonstrably justified limitation being pursued.

Section 6 - Interpretation consistent with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (“BORA”)
11.          Recent judicial pronouncements demonstrate that the courts are utilising the direction in Section 6 of the Bill of Rights Act to accord preference to meanings of enactments that are consistent with the rights and freedoms contained in the Act. In Baigent’s Case for example, the Court of Appeal applied Section 6 in conjunction with sections 3 and 21 of the Bill of Rights Act when interpreting Section 6(5) of the Crown Proceedings Act 1950 determining whether proceedings could be brought against the Crown for a search in bad faith by the police. The Court concluded that “[i]t is consistent with that affirmed right [right to be secure against unreasonable search and seizure] to interpret s 6(5) of the Crown Proceedings Act as not protecting the Crown from liability for the execution of a search warrant in bad faith” (Baigent’s Case [1994] 3 NZLR 667, 674 per Cooke P (as he then was)).

12.          In Moonen v Film and Literature Board of Review (1999) 5 HRNZ 224, 234 the Court of Appeal stated that “where an enactment can be given a meaning that is consistent with the rights and freedoms contained in the Bill of Rights, that meaning shall be preferred to any other. Thus if there are two tenable meanings, the one which is most in harmony with the Bill of Rights must be adopted” (Moonen para [16]). When considering the meaning of the words “promotes or supports” in Section 3 of the Films, Videos, and Publications Classification Act 1993 the Court emphasised that a Bill of Rights consistent approach was required and that those words had to be given such available meaning which impinges as little as possible on freedom of expression.

13.          The Court of Appeal went a step further in the recent decision of R v Poumako [2000] 2 NZLR 695, 702:
The meaning to be preferred is that which is consistent (or more consistent) with the rights and freedoms in the Bill of Rights. It is not a matter of what the legislature (or an individual member) might have intended. The direction is that whenever a meaning consistent with the Bill of Rights can be given, it is to be preferred.

14.          While remaining within the appropriate realm of statutory interpretation, the courts continue to ensure a level of protection for human rights in New Zealand similar in large measure to that achieved in jurisdictions where a Bill of Rights or its equivalent has the status of superior law.

Compliance with the Bill of Rights Act
15.          The legislation passed by a local body authority is subordinate legislation. Whereas Parliament is able to pass legislation despite a report from the Attorney General under Section 7 of the BORA indicating a conflict with BORA. Local bodies do not enjoy this power, Parliament has expressly stated that this is so in section 155 of the Local Government Act 2002.

16.          Section 5 of the BORA provides that the rights and freedoms contained in the Act may be subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. In determining whether a limitation is “demonstrably justified”, the Court of Appeal in its above mentioned Moonen decision set out the test to determine whether or not a limitation is “demonstrably justified” (Moonen para [18]):
(i)         Identify objective that the Legislature was endeavouring to achieve by the provision in question.
(ii) Assess the importance and significance of that objective.
(iii)          The way in which the objective is statutorily achieved must be in reasonable proportion to the importance of the objective.
(iv)           The means used must also have a rational relationship with the objective.
(v) In achieving the objective there must be as little interference as possible with the right or freedom affected.
(vi)           The limitation involved must be justifiable in light of the objective.

Some  Legal Issues Re Freedom of Expression

17.           Forcing people to obtain a permit prior to speaking, preaching or undertaking any other public performance is a blatant fetter on a person’s section 14 BORA right to freedom of expression.

18.          The need for prior consent from the Council before undertaking preaching, playing an instrument or distributing any written material etc is so broad as to be positively dangerous.

19.          The requirement of a permit amounts to a form of censorship through license which makes impossible the free and unhampered freedom of expression through speech or the distribution of pamphlets and strikes at the very heart of BORA guarantees. It is a fact of history that numerous small groups and individuals often must rely on the distribution of circulars. The hand distribution of religious tracts is an age-old form of missionary evangelism — as old as the history of printing presses and has been a potent force in various religious and political movements down through the years. In this sense the bylaw unfairly targets the poorly financed causes of little people. Individuals or groups with ready access to funds can afford to advertise in the print media of television unimpeded by the draconian requirements of having to request permission from their territorial authority.

20.          To impose a blanket requirement for any public performance, lecture, busking, singing, preaching, or playing of any instrument, or the distribution of written material to only occur with prior Council consent, is too broad. It may be argued that such a requirement is necessary for health and safety or other reasons but individual's right to freedom of expression must be considered. The requirement applies to non-commercial canvassers as well as salespeople and covers not only religious causes, but extends to include all political activity as well as a child seeking sponsorship for the 40 Hour Famine, in short the requirement of prior permission covers all types of activity regardless of size or duration would on its face be too blunt a tool. It would seem to extend to ‘residents casually soliciting the votes of neighbours,’ to enlist support for employing a more efficient garbage collector."

21.          It is offensive — not only to the values protected by the BORA, but to the very notion of a free society — that in the context of everyday public discourse a citizen must first inform the government of her desire to speak to her fellow citizens and then obtain a permit to do so.

22.          It should not be a requirement of free speech that the speaker has to disclose his or her identity. A person advocating any cause should not feel any compulsion to reveal their identity to anyone. The need to disclose one’s identity to a Council official prior to engaging in free speech may act as a deterrent to the exercise of the free speech.

23.          In this sense the proposed bylaw impinges upon the right to engage in anonymous speech.  The requirement that a person must be identified in a permit application filed in the Council office necessarily results in a surrender of that anonymity and may preclude such persons from canvassing for unpopular causes.

24.          In addition to chilling free speech by removing the option of anonymous speech, the proposed bylaw would effectively ban a significant amount of spontaneous speech by interposing the registration and permit requirement between the decision to speak and the actual speech itself. Even a spontaneous decision to go across the street and urge a fellow citizen to vote against the current Council or the traffic bypass could not lawfully be implemented without first obtaining Council’s permission. Further some persons might, based on religious or idiosyncratic secular views, choose not to speak at all rather than register.

25.          The right to anonymity, especially cherished by speakers advancing unpopular causes, can often be neglected. But it remains just as important today as ever, when the inclination of the powerful — especially government officials and politicians — to retaliate against those who would criticise them seems to be on the rise.

26.           In order to maintain the basic norm of freedom in our society, we must be ever vigilant of government efforts to regulate the citizenry in anticipation of potential unlawful conduct, rather than in response to such conduct. Nowhere is that more true than in the area of speech, where history has proven that the government’s motives are often less than pure, and that petty bureaucrats will abuse any mechanism for controlling speech if given half a chance. As a matter of principle a requirement of registration in order to make a public speech would seem generally incompatible with an exercise of the rights of free speech and free assembly.  A requirement that one must register before he or she undertakes to make a public speech to enlist support for a lawful movement is quite incompatible with the requirements of the BORA.

Begging and the Right to Freedom of Expression
27.          Current moves for example in Auckland to consider banning begging  is inconsistant with section 14 BORA. Pursuant to section 14 BORA all persons have the right to freedom of expression, including the right to seek, receive and impart information through any media, including orally, in writing or in the form of art.

28.          As a first principle I consider that the proscription and criminalisation of begging constitutes an infraction of the fundamental human right to freedom of expression.

29.          Such restrictions violate the right to freedom of expression in two basic respects. First, the proscription of begging renders peaceful verbal or written communication unlawful. Anti-begging provisions apply whether a person adopts passive begging techniques (such as sitting or standing in one spot with a cup, a hat or a sign) or more active begging techniques (such as approaching passers-by and entreating them to donate money). In each case, it is the act of expressing a need for money, rather than the conduct associated with that expression, that is the target of anti-begging provisions.

30.          Second, anti-begging provisions infringe the right to freedom of expression in that they proscribe the imparting (and, by extension, the receiving) of communications regarding the way in which society treats its poor and disenfranchised. In many cases, begging amounts to an expression of poverty, alienation, homelessness, dislocation and the effects of inadequate social security, public housing and public health systems.  In the US, many anti-begging provisions have been struck down or narrowed on the basis of inconsistency with the First Amendment right to freedom of expression: see, eg, Benefit v Cambridge, 424 Mass 918 (1997) per Greaney J:
We conclude that no compelling State interest has been demonstrated that would warrant punishing a beggar's peaceful communication with his or her fellow citizens in a public place. (6) As one writer on the subject has observed: "At the least, for some panhandlers, begging is a way to augment their meager sources. For a few, it may be their only source of income. Panhandling is therefore close to the center of the personal liberty of some people in contemporary American society." Munzer, Response to Ellickson on "Chronic Misconduct" in Urban Spaces: Of Panhandlers, Bench Squatters, and Day Laborers, 32 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 1, 11 (1997). The statute intrudes not only on the right of free communication, but it also implicates and suppresses an even broader right -- the right to engage fellow human beings with the hope of receiving aid and compassion. The streets and public areas are quintessential public forums, not because they are a particularly convenient platform for expression, but because they are the necessary, essential public spaces that connect our individual private spaces, from which we legitimately may exclude others and likewise be excluded, but from which we almost all must inevitably emerge from time to time. If such a basic transaction as peacefully requesting or giving casual help to the needy may be forbidden in all such places, then we may belong to the government that regulates us and not the other way around. (7) [emphasis added]

31.          The criminalisation of begging denies to persons who beg a form of expression that may be necessary for survival. It also denies the truly poor the right to impart, and society the right to receive, information regarding poverty, inequality, structural inadequacies and the need for urgent social reform. By silencing people who beg, anti-begging provisions stifle debate about social policies regarding the poor.

Human Rights Violated by Camping Provisions
32.          A number of territorial authorities  have restrictions on so-called camping. Such restrictions impact upon the homeless and breach rights to freedom of expression, movement and constitute a form of treatment/punishment that is cruel, degrading, disproportionate and severe in terms of section 9 BORA. The provisions are also offensive to New Zealand’s obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”).

Right to be Free from Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment (s9 BORA and ICCPR)
33.          Pursuant to art 7 of the ICCPR, no person shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment. According to the HRC, the aim of art 7 is to ‘protect both the physical and mental integrity … and the dignity’ of the human person by prohibiting not only ‘acts that cause physical pain, but also acts that cause mental suffering’.[1] The Human Rights Committee (“HRC”) recognises that the issue as to whether treatment or punishment is proscribed by art 7 is contingent upon the nature, purpose and severity of the treatment having regard to the conduct being punished.[2]

34.          Laws that target or disproportionately impact upon activities associated with the state of homelessness — such as laws that criminalise sleeping/camping or storing belongings in public space — violate the right to be free from cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment. [3] Such laws discriminatorily affect homeless people on the grounds of their housing status and the necessary location of their conduct, not on the basis that their behaviour itself is reprehensible and therefore ought to be criminal.  In so doing, these laws violate common standards of decency and constitute punishment that is disproportionately severe to the ‘crime’.

35.          Further a number of the homeless are alcoholics and or suffer from a range of illnesses including mental illness. To enact bylaws, which will lead to arrest and subsequent fining of people who have no means to pay, and which may ultimately lead to their imprisonment is both cruel and unusual. Often with such people it is the location, rather than the nature, of the conduct that renders it unlawful. For example a homeless person could not be charged with sleeping, drinking, swearing, urinating or littering in a conventional home.

36.          The impact of prohibiting the performance of essential human acts in public on those experiencing homelessness is cruel, unusual and degrading. As critical social theorist and lawyer Jeremy Waldron opines:
If urinating is prohibited in public places (and if there are no public lavatories) then the homeless are simply unfree to urinate. These are not altogether comfortable conclusions, and they are certainly not comfortable for those who have to live with them.[4]
         Waldron goes on to say:
Though … there is nothing particularly dignified about sleeping or urinating, there is certainly something deeply and inherently undignified about being prevented from doing so. … We should be ashamed that we have allowed our laws of public and private property to reduce a million or more citizens to something approaching this level of degradation.[5]

37.          The impact of fining homeless people for breaches of public space regulations is also cruel, unusual and degrading. As the United States Supreme Court analogised in Robinson v California, imprisonment and fines do not, in the abstract, constitute cruel and unusual punishment, but ‘[e]ven one day in prison would be cruel and unusual punishment for the “crime” of having a common cold.’[6]

38.          Moreover, in relation to the homeless fines do not serve the principle purposes of sentencing — namely, deterrence and rehabilitation. They are neither commensurate with, nor justified by, the nature and gravity of their conduct, nor their culpability and degree of responsibility for their conduct, in light of their homeless state. In fact, fining a homeless person for his conduct exacerbates the underlying causes of his poverty, disengagement, depression and frustration. This is particularly the case when the homeless are specifically targeted for the selective enforcement of laws.

39.       Rather than punishing homeless people for acts that they necessarily perform in public, it is imperative that we, as a community, develop humane responses. Such responses could not only afford homeless people greater dignity and respect, but could also address legitimate concerns (such as sanitation in the case of a person who urinates in public) through constructive responses (such as the provision of adequate and accessible public restrooms).




[1]  HRC, CCPR General Comment 20: Replaces General Comment 7 Concerning Prohibition of Torture and Cruel Treatment or Punishment, [2].
[2] Ibid [4]
[3] See generally National Coalition for the Homeless, US, Illegal to be Homeless: The
Criminalisation of Homelessness in the United States (2001) 37.
[4] Jeremy Waldron, ‘Homelessness and the Issue of Freedom’ (1991) 39 UCLA Law Review
295, 315.
[5] Ibid 320.
[6] 370 US 660, 667 (1962).

Tuesday, 4 June 2013

The Novopay Inquiry: Lessons from Lombard

I have a number of concerns about Stephen Joyce's Ministerial Inquiry into the Novopay debacle. First, a cabinet minister picked the investigators to undertake the inquiry. If an inquiry is to be undertaken that in part investigates the conduct of ministers and if the process is to have the appearance of independence, cabinet should remain removed from the appointment process. 

Secondly, the report  cleared ministers but blamed advisers; that is that the Ministers relied upon bad advice and are therefore are not to blame. This ignores the constitutional convention of ministerial responsibility in the Westminster system whereby a cabinet minister bears ultimate responsibility for the actions of their ministry or department. 

Lastly, what shouldn't be forgotten is that the same type of argument was run as a defence and rejected by the Court in the prosecution of Sir Douglas Graham et al over the Lombard collapse. 

"Michael Reeves, who read from a prepared statement when he gave evidence in the Wellington High Court yesterday afternoon, said not only did Lombard never respond to any regulatory authority without legal advice, but any document sent to an investor received the same treatment. Whatever area that advice covered, be it legal, audit or accounting related, the advice was always followed, Mr Reeves said." (NBR "Lombard decisions based upon expert advice - former CEO" 7/12/11)

In part the downfall of the directors of Lombard Finance came not from dodgy dealings, but from their failure to ask appropriate questions about the advice received. 

In R v Graham [2012] NZHC 265 (the Lombard decision) the directors argued that they properly relied on management and external professional advisers (eg professional auditors, the trustee and solicitors). Dobson J found that a  director cannot ignore an issue with an offer document raised by a professional adviser. Similarly directors cannot claim that they met the standard of care expected of them, "....  in the positive sense to the absence of warning signals from competent external advisers". The absence of such warnings may make it "marginally easier" for directors to establish a reasonable belief, however it is ultimately "directors' obligations in relation to the accuracy of content of offer documents are non-delegable". 

The same is true for reliance on management. Dobson J found that as long as directors adequately monitor management, and there is nothing to put the directors on notice of the need for further inquiry, "reliance on information provided by management in their delegated areas of authority will generally be appropriate". As Dobson J opined, "Directors are appointed to exercise judgment and that extends to testing the competence of management within areas in which managers are relied upon". 

The same logic has to apply to running the country. It is disturbing to me that those who are appointed to run a  private business are held, in the Lombard case, to a higher degree of personal accountability, than those who run an entire country. 

Labour's education spokesperson, Chris Hipkin's was right when he said, "... ministers had to ask the difficult questions about advice provided to them. "It is up to the ministers to say, "That advice is not good enough and I want better."" (Dompost 5 June 2013). 

Saturday, 25 May 2013

Unlawful Legal Aid Policy - Another Simon Power Train-Wreck

The Court of Appeal yesterday found that the Government's fixed fee legal aid regime was illegal (Criminal Bar Association v Attorney General [2013] NZCA 176 (24 May 2013)). This is yet another Government stuff up. This time in rolling out an unlawful legal aid policy. This fiasco too can be sheeted home to Simon Power. Power got rid of provocation because of one case where the jury properly rejected it; got rid of depositions to speed up trials, but in so doing made the delays longer than ever. Power was also the SOE Minister responsible for Solid Energy as it embarked on a thoroughly reckless and stupid expansion plan. It was  Power who wrote to Solid Energy telling them to borrow big and hand more cash back to the state(1), which has been proven to be disastrous advice.  With this impressive track record he has now moved to bestow the benefits of his "experience" on Westpac Bank. What experience does Power have in banking? It was only a few years ago he was an average staff solicitor in Palmerston North who hardly ever darkened a courtroom. I would have thought with the train-wrecks Power leaves behind after he moves on, that he was more suited to a career in demolition?

When the Legal Services Bill was being debated in the House, opposition MPs raised concerns about the lack of independence in making grants, and how the new scheme would adopt a "one size fits all" approach to legal aid grants regardless of complexity or the vulnerability of the client. The Government assured the House, that this would not be so as the Commissioner could exercise discretion. This was disingenuous. As the Court observed first quoting from the then Minister (Simon Power):

[98] Concerns about the independence of the legal aid system again featured in the committee stage of the consideration of the Legal Services Bill, and in its second and third readings. In moving the third reading the Minister of Justice said:

… Submitters were concerned that the transfer of the legal aid system to the Ministry of Justice may reduce the level of independence in the legal aid system. We thought about this carefully in the policy design, and I am pleased that the committee agreed that the position of the Legal Services Commissioner will guarantee that independence. … 

Power was specifically warned in the House about the lack of independence and the fettering of the decision makers discretion. As the Court noted:

[99] Outlining his party’s continued opposition to the bill on its third reading, Mr Locke MP referred to the importance of preserving:
… the necessary independence that a legal services body requires. Putting in a supposedly independent statutory officer, the Legal Services Commissioner, will not necessarily solve that problem. 
He added: 
The report back from the select committee says: “It is important that while the Commissioner would be accountable to the Secretary for Justice, the Secretary should not be able to interfere in the Commissioner’s performance of his or her independent functions as set out in the bill.” That is all very well, but, as we have found in other areas, when an officer is reporting to someone above them in the hierarchy their responses are a bit conditioned by the responses of the higher-up officer. That issue was raised as part of the debate on the bill that merged Archives New Zealand and the National Library and put them under the Department of Internal Affairs. Even though there is an independent Chief Archivist, the Chief Archivist has to report to the head of the Department of Internal Affairs. A similar situation will constrain the real independence of the Legal Services Commissioner, particularly when monetary matters are involved, as they are with legal services and as they are in the case of the Chief Archivist and the Department of Internal Affairs. Budgets can be restricted and so on, so we do not think there is sufficient independence in the system. 

So how did the independence so carefully thought about by this Minister actually work in reality?

[121] The problem with the current Policy is the combination of a fixed fee for almost every grant of legal aid combined with the lack of any effective room for the Commissioner (or his delegate) to amend the grant, even where the Commissioner considers an amendment is appropriate. We are referring to what Mr Harrison termed in his submissions the “unusually complex and completely inadequate test for an amendment to the grant”. In the absence of at least two of the factors mentioned in the Policy, or a particularly vulnerable complainant, and proof that the fixed fee will be “completely inadequate in reflecting the cost of completing the activity”, the Commissioner has no discretion to move the case out of the fixed fee category. We consider that test sets a threshold so high that it constitutes an unacceptable limit on the exercise by the Commissioner of his discretion. 

[125] In [111] we noted Simon France J’s view that it was “far too early” to use the statistics we have summarised in [110]. While there is some force in the Judge’s view, the fact that only 0.4 per cent of 10,000 cases had been transferred to the complex case category, against the anticipated 4.5 per cent, does suggest that the threshold for transfer is extremely difficult to meet. 

[126] It follows that we accept the appellant’s argument that the Policy is also unlawful in that it unreasonably fetters the Commissioner’s discretions under ss 16, 23 and 28 of the 2011 Act. Accordingly we answer Question 3: ‘Yes, the Fixed Fee Policy unreasonably fetters the Commissioner’s discretion under the 2011 Act’. 

In the time since the fixed fee policy was introduced a number of practitioners will no longer take on legal aid cases - it is just uneconomic, still others have moved on to new careers.  The feeling of many is that the fee regime is designed to slowly drive practitioners from the system. 

Now having been told that the fixed fee regime is illegal what will the Ministry do? Don't expect sweetness and light or even an apology. The Ministry and the Minister will treat this, if past experience is a guide, as merely an obstacle to be got around. The tragedy is that when looking at the system objectively, there is blatantly no independence in decision making. Any competent lawyer  would have seen that from day one.

1 - http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/PA1303/S00254/questions-and-answers-march-14.htm; and
http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=10871040

Thursday, 16 May 2013

Decision Maker for QCs Recommends Himself

The Attorney General Chris Finlayson passes applications for QC on to the Governor General for appointment to silk, following a process of consultation. As he himself was recently appointed a QC this must mean he recommended himself? As the Guidelines say, "Pursuant to regulation 4 of the Queen’s Counsel Regulations 2012 appointments are made on the recommendation of the Attorney-General and with the concurrence of the Chief Justice of New Zealand." 

There is a precedent for similar behaviour. From memory I am pretty certain that then Prime Minister Rob Muldoon effectively awarded himself a knighthood. 


For completeness, the relevant section of the Guidelines states:
 


"QUEEN’S COUNSEL – GUIDELINES 
FOR CANDIDATES 
2013 
Introduction 
The rank of Queen’s Counsel is awarded to barristers sole who have demonstrated excellence 
in their careers as litigators. The standard is high and will not be reached merely by 
completing a certain number of years in practice. Candidates are encouraged to consider 
carefully and to consult with senior colleagues before submitting an application. 
These Guidelines are issued by the Attorney-General and Chief Justice pursuant to 
regulation 5 of the Lawyers and Conveyancers Act (Lawyers: Queen’s Counsel) Regulations 
2012. 
These Guidelines outline the criteria for appointment and provide information on the 
qualifications and experience that should be possessed by lawyers seeking appointment as 
Queen’s Counsel and the process by which candidates will be recommended for appointment. 
Appointments 
Appointments to Queen’s Counsel are made by the Governor-General, by Letters Patent, 
under the Royal prerogative. Pursuant to regulation 4 of the Queen’s Counsel Regulations 
2012 appointments are made on the recommendation of the Attorney-General and with the 
concurrence of the Chief Justice of New Zealand. 
To be considered for appointment candidates must be barristers sole specialising in litigation. 
Queen’s Counsel are required to continue to practise independently, as barristers sole."